

Quantum LLL

with an Application to Mersenne Number Cryptosystems

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- Quantum circuit representation of LLL
 - for (textbook) rational numbers
 - for floating-point approximation
- Resource estimates of (sub)circuits, in Toffoli-gates
- Focus on qubits count

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Does Grover with a QLLL give us the desired improvement?

(Classical) LLL

- 1: **Input:** Basis $B = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_r)$
- 2: **Output:** Reduced Basis \hat{B}
- 3: $B^*, M \leftarrow \text{GSO}(B)$
- 4: $k \leftarrow 2$
- 5: **while** $k \leq r$ **do**
- 6: Size-reduce(b_k, b_{k-1})
- 7: **if** Lovász condition holds on b_k, b_{k-1} **then**
- 8: Size-reduce($b_k, \{b_j\}_{0 \leq j \leq k-1}$), update M
- 9: $k++$
- 10: **else**
- 11: swap b_k, b_{k-1} , update M
- 12: $k := \max(2, k - 1)$
- 13: **end if**
- 14: **end while**

- Rational M : **Lenstra1982**
- Floating-point approximation M :
Schnorr:1988:MEA:48880.48883

“Best” variant: L^2 **10.1007/11426639-13**

(many more)

Registers

$|B\rangle$ Basis representing a superposition of integer lattices

$|M^{(i)}\rangle$ transformation M in iteration i s.t.: $B = MB^*$

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Arithmetic in \mathbb{Q} or \mathbb{R} , *vector operations* in \mathbb{Z}

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
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
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Notations

function $f(X)$

uncompute (run circuit backwards) $(f(X))^{-1}$





Pitfall I: unbounded loops

Classical

- Apply operation until loop terminates

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
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
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Quantum: worst-case running time for all (unbounded) loops

Pitfall Part II: size-reduction cleanup

Size reduction: $b_j \xrightarrow{\text{reduce by } b_j} \hat{b}_j$

Update M s.t. $\hat{B} = M\hat{B}^*$

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Classical

$$\lceil m_{ij} \rceil \leftarrow \text{round}(m_{ij})$$

$$\hat{b}_i \leftarrow b_i - \lceil m_{ij} \rceil b_j$$

$$\hat{m}_{ij} \leftarrow m_{ij} - \lceil m_{ij} \rceil$$

$$\text{free}(\lceil m_{ij} \rceil), \text{free}(b_i), \text{free}(m_{ij})$$

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
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m_{ij}, b_i can not be recomputed from $\hat{m}_{ij}, \hat{b}_{ij}$

\Rightarrow information about *larger* basis is lost

Pitfall Part II: size-reduction cleanup

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


$|m_{ij}\rangle, |b_i\rangle$ can not be recomputed from $|\hat{m}_{ij}\rangle, |\hat{b}_{ij}\rangle$

$\Rightarrow |b_i\rangle, |m_{ij}\rangle$ or $|[m_{ij}]\rangle$ need to be preserved for reversibility

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Quantum: need *fresh* memory in every size-reduction


(similar issues arises from divisions/ preserving the remainder for fp-numbers)

Impact?

$$\begin{array}{c} |M^{(0)}\rangle|0\rangle\dots|0\rangle \\ \text{size-reduce} \downarrow \\ |M^{(0)}\rangle|M^{(1)}\rangle|0\rangle\dots|0\rangle \end{array}$$


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
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- How many qubits does this require?
 - $\text{sizeof}(M)$ qubits for each reduction
 - $\text{bound}(K)$ many iterations
 - $\text{bound}(K) \times \text{sizeof}(M)$


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
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Bad if $\text{bound}(K)$ is large


Can we do better?



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→ Requires at most: $j \times \text{sizeof}(M)$ qubits

Impact?

$$|M^{(0)}\rangle$$

Impact?

$$\begin{aligned} & |M^{(0)}\rangle \\ \rightarrow & |M^{(0)}\rangle |M^{(j)}\rangle \end{aligned}$$

Impact?

$$|M^{(0)}\rangle$$

$$\rightarrow |M^{(0)}\rangle|M^{(j)}\rangle$$

$\rightarrow \dots$

$$\rightarrow |M^{(0)}\rangle|M^{(j)}\rangle\dots|M^{(\text{bound}(K))}\rangle$$

(Optimal for $j = \sqrt{\text{bound}(K)}$)

$|M^{(0)}\rangle$

→ $|M^{(0)}\rangle|M^{(j)}\rangle$

→ ...

→ $|M^{(0)}\rangle|M^{(j)}\rangle\dots|M^{(\text{bound}(K))}\rangle$

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Trade-off:

(Maximal) number of qubits: $\sqrt{\text{bound}(K)} \times \text{sizeOf}(M)$

For # additional iterations: $\text{bound}(K)$

Resource Estimate

- Given basis $B := (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_r)$, $b_i \in \mathbb{Z}^d$
- (qu)bit-length n in b_i
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$$\text{QLLL} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{\#Toffoli} \\ O\left(2 \log \hat{B}(r^3 d + r^4) \left(\frac{n^2}{\log n} + 2n\right)\right) \end{array} \quad \left| \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{\#Qubits} \\ \max(d, r) \cdot n \end{array} \right.$$

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$$\begin{array}{l} \text{text-book} \\ \text{Schnorr} \\ L^2 \end{array} \left| \begin{array}{c} \# \text{Qubits}_M \\ O\left(r^3 d \log \hat{B} (\log \hat{B})^{\frac{1}{2}}\right) \\ O\left(r^2 d \log \hat{B} (\log \hat{B})^{\frac{1}{2}}\right) \\ O\left(r (\log \hat{B})^{\frac{1}{2}} (1.6d + o(d))\right) \end{array} \right.$$

Application: Groverization of Attack on Mersenne number cryptosystems

Problem

- Given $a, b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ with *low* Hamming weight, $G \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
- Given $pk := aG + b = H \pmod p$, Find a, b

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(Best) approach due to **Beunardeau2017OnTH** applies lattice reduction after partitioning sparse a, b , such that each partition represents small number



Resource Estimate of Grover Oracle

Instantiation for 256-bits of security with $n = 756839$ the QLLL oracle requires:

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	#Toffoli	#Qubits
text-book	$\approx 2^{85}$	$\approx 2^{52}$
Schnorr	$\approx 2^{65}$	$\approx 2^{44}$
L^2	$\approx 2^{55}$	$\approx 2^{33}$

Quantum

vs.

Classical

- Apply size-reduction **and** swap conditionally
- Average is worst-case, domain knowledge gives significant improvements!
- Split LLL reduction to improve qubit overhead
 $O\left(r^3 d \log \hat{B} (\log \hat{B})^{\frac{1}{2}}\right)$

- Apply either size-reduction **or** swap
- Bad worst-case, good (empirical) average time